Beijing has a moral and legal obligation to take biosafety seriously, especially given the kind of research going on at WIV. In 2015, WIV’s Dr. Shi Zhengli co-wrote an article titled “A SARS-like Cluster of Circulating Bat Coronaviruses Shows Potential for Human Emergence” in which she admitted that her team had engineered “chimeric” and “hybrid” viruses from horseshoe bats. In a 2019 article titled “Bat Coronavirus in China,” Ms. Shi and her co-authors warned, “It is highly likely that future SARS- or MERS-like coronavirus outbreaks will originate from bats, and there is an increased probability that this will occur in China.” At the time, WIV housed tens of thousands of bat virus samples and experiment animals.
China resisted international monitoring at WIV. The lab was built with French assistance, but China abrogated its promise to allow French scientists to participate in essential research there. China then accredited WIV through its own agency as its only level 4 facility, and the country’s National Health Commission quickly approved it to handle some of the world’s most dangerous viruses. The Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology completed a comprehensive safety and management survey of China’s 75 bioresearch labs in 2016, finding that WIV didn’t even make the top 20 in terms of quality.
The People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, has admitted to developing bioweapons. In 2011 China informed the International Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference that its military experts were working on the “creation of man-made pathogens,” “genomics laying the foundation for pathogen transformation,” “population-specific genetic markers,” and “targeted drug-delivery technology making it easier to spread pathogens.” A 2015 PLA study treated the 2003 SARS coronavirus outbreak as a “contemporary genetic weapon” launched by foreign forces. And in January 2021, the State Department confirmed that people had fallen mysteriously ill at WIV in fall 2019, and that WIV conducts secret bioweapons research with the PLA.
The negligence at China’s biolabs, especially WIV, was so dangerous that the PLA dispatched a general to take over the facility soon after the outbreak in Wuhan. Xi Jinping’s first speech on the outbreak highlighted “lessons learned” about “shortcomings” and “leaking holes” in China’s management of biological material and biological-security system. He demanded that “a new biological-security law” be made part of the “national-security system.”
《华尔街日报》(The Wall Street Journal)近期曾报道称,中国有关部门发现,2019年10月至12月期间有92名医院患者的症状表明他们可能感染了新冠病毒。他们中没有一个人的抗体检测呈阳性,但该WHO团队认为这些结果不具有结论性,因为相关检测是在任何可能的感染迹象已消失一年多后才进行的。
该团队正寻求获得用于从上述期间逾7万例类流感疾病、发烧或肺炎病例中识别出潜在新冠患者的数据。接受《科学》(Science)杂志采访时,该团队带头人、食品安全科学家安巴雷克(Peter Ben Embarek)建议使用不那么严格的标准来识别大约1,000个潜在新冠病例。
Health experts say other countries short of testing kits can also learn from Wuhan’s experience. Unable to test thousands of suspected cases, on Feb. 4, health authorities allowed doctors to use chest scans to make coronavirus diagnoses in Hubei.
That resulted in a spike in confirmed cases, stunning the outside world. By Feb. 19, however, the number of newly confirmed cases in Wuhan had dropped into the hundreds and by March 11, it was down to single digits. The number of deaths has declined steadily since Feb. 18.
A recent study led by doctors at Wuhan’s Tongji Medical College estimated that the reproduction number of the virus—the average number of people infected by each infected person—was about 3.68 in Wuhan before the lockdown began on Jan. 23.
That number, which has to be reduced to below one to stop an epidemic, dropped to 0.32 between Feb. 2 and 18, the study found.